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China’s Campaign to Open the West: Xinjiang and the Center 
Robert Vaughn Moeller, M.A. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
 
 
This paper examines China’s ambitious Campaign to Open the West and its impact upon Han 
and ethnic minority populations in Xinjiang. It focuses on analyzing the components of the 
campaign that are being implemented to develop Xinjiang through the intensification of 
agriculture, exploitation of energy resources, and reforms to Xinjiang’s education system, 
revealing that the campaign, rather than alleviating poverty, is leading to greater asymmetry 
between Han and ethnic minority populations within Xinjiang.  Rather than a plan for bridging 
the gap of economic disparity between the eastern and western regions of China, as construed by 
Beijing, the plan fits into a greater strategy for integration and assimilation of Xinjiang’s restive 
ethnic population by Beijing.       
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
As Deng Xiaoping declared in the early 1980’s that some regions and people within China 
should be allowed to become rich before others, he was ushering in an era of economic reforms 
that were a departure from China’s traditional socialist economic policies.1  Under Deng 
Xiaoping’s leadership, government policies designed to concentrate investment resources in 
regions with high growth potential along China’s coasts were implemented.  With favorable 
geographic settings, natural endowment, basic infrastructure, and access to foreign capital, 
China’s eastern and southern coastal regions have experienced unprecedented economic growth.  
With a sustained annual growth rate of nearly 10%, China has experienced an economic miracle 
similar to that of the East Asian NICs  and seems poised for ushering in the “Chinese century” 
(Tian 2004).    
  However, China’s leadership has become increasingly concerned that the realization of 
a “Chinese century” may be challenged by regional inequalities resulting from China’s regional 
economic policies.2 This concern was illustrated by Jiang Zemin when he declared that, “the 
development of the west is crucial to China’s stability, the Communist Party’s hold on power, 
and the revitalization of the Chinese people,” (Pomfret 2000). While coastal Special Economic 
                                                 
1 See Chang (1988) for a discussion of the changes in economic policy introduced under Deng Xiaoping’s 
leadership. 
2 See Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang (1999) for detailed analysis of the increasing rate of inequality between 
China’s regions. 
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Zones (SEZs) and eastern urban centers have flourished economically, China’s western and 
interior regions, comprising more than twenty-three percent of the population and more than half 
of China’s total land area, still lag behind with high rates of poverty and lower levels of 
development.  Many of China’s 100 million ethnic minorities live in this region and, especially 
in Xinjiang, economic disparities fuel ethnic tensions. Wary of ethnic nationalist separatist 
movements in Xinjiang and potential social manifestations of uneven development, the Chinese 
central government has initiated an ambitious development campaign: the “Great Western 
Development Drive” 西部打开发 to counter the threat of political disintegration and to bolster 
the west’s integration with the rest of China. 
Though this development drive, initiated in 1999, has attracted a lot of attention from 
scholars who have been debating Beijing’s intentions behind the implementation of the 
development campaign, there is still a need for more analysis of the campaign’s initial economic 
and social impact upon Xinjiang’s Han and ethnic populations.  This paper hopes to address this 
gap by presenting an analysis of the  components of the campaign that are being implemented to 
develop Xinjiang through the intensification of agriculture, exploitation of energy resources, and 
reforms to Xinjiang’s education system to determine whether the campaign has been as 
successful as Chinese media outlets claim. 
“In June 1999 in the ancient city of Xian, Comrade Jiang Zemin made the appeal to the 
whole party and the people of the whole country on the great development of the western 
region.  Three years have gone by, and the roads have become passable, the lights have 
become lit, the mountains have become green, the rivers have become clear and the 
traveling traders have become abundant.  One after another, wonderful stories about the 
homeland of the western region have been circulated and sung.”3
 
                                                 
3 Xinhua News Agency, November 12, 2002. 
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  Basing this research on the hypothesis that this development campaign and its policies 
may be another incarnation of Beijing’s minority policy as a means to promote greater 
integration and assimilation of Xinjiang’s population of ethnic minorities, I have analyzed the 
policies being implemented under the campaign to determine whether the economic benefits of 
the campaign are accruing to Uighur, Han Chinese, or the state. Using Chinese census data from 
1990 and 2000, I have identified prior trends for economic growth and development to be 
compared with development trends after the 1999 implementation of the “Go West Campaign.”   
In addition, this paper examines the trends towards an increase or decrease in Xinjiang’s cultural 
divison of labor between Uighur and Han Chinese to determine whether the campaign is 
achieving its goals of alleviating poverty in Xinjiang and bridging the growing economic 
disparity between not only Xinjiang’s Han and ethnic minorities, but also eastern and western 
China.    
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2.0  THE PLAN IN CONTEXT 
As a part of China’s west, Xinjiang, which constitutes one sixth of the territory of the PRC, is 
endowed with abundant resources, shares borders with Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, and is home to more than a dozen 
ethnic minority groups who together constitute a majority of the population. This territory is not 
only strategically and economically important to China, but has become a testing ground for this 
new regional economic policy.  Though on the surface this policy appears poised to rectify 
regional economic imbalances, with benefits accruing to both Xinjiang as a region and China as 
a whole, there are aspects of this policy which suggest that the benefits from this policy may 
accrue to Han and non-Han populations unequally, further aggravating existing imbalances 
within Xinjiang itself.  This imbalance is particularly salient since much of the recent separatist 
activity has been linked to Han chauvinism and economic inequality between Han and other 
ethnic minorities (Mackerras 2001:293-294).   
Many Western scholars who study inter-ethnic co-existence in China’s minority regions 
have increasingly begun to note the ethnic imbalances of wealth and cultural divisions of labor,4 
and infer that the relationship between minority and majority Han regions resembles that of a 
                                                 
4 In their examination of 1982 and 1990 PRC census data, Hannum and Xie (1998) found that compared with Han  
Chinese, Uighurs were overrepresented in agriculture and underrepresented in industry and service sectors  which 
correspond with higher gross salaries.  
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colony with its metropole.5 Though Xinjiang is classified as the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) and official pronouncements laud the autonomy regime as a system of self 
government for minorities “established for the exercise of autonomy and for people of ethnic 
minorities to become masters of their own areas,”6 many Western scholars claim that autonomy 
is limited.7 They cite Beijing’s broad discretionary power over Xinjiang’s affairs, and the 
manner in which autonomy is implemented, as well as Beijing’s unilateral power over resource 
exploitation, policing, and other matters which are unbound by power-sharing arrangements 
through China’s autonomous region regime (Bovingdon 2004).  Binh Phan has even likened 
China’s autonomous areas to “political eunuchs serving at the pleasure of the Communist court 
in Beijing.” (1996:85).   
Though the PRC has departed from the Soviet model in most aspects, China’s system of 
autonomous regions has been compared to Moscow’s relations with its union republics prior to 
the collapse of the USSR.  According to Gleason, Moscow “both defined the sphere of authority 
and exercised it” in a manner similar to Beijing’s own approach to its autonomous regions 
(Gleason 1990: 65).  Though there have been recent debates on the subject, in-depth studies on 
core-periphery relations remain limited and the responses and effects of the “Go West 
Development Campaign” are just now beginning to trickle out of the region.   
Though the campaign to develop western China does have a publicly stated aim to rectify 
regional imbalances and improve the economic well being of western China’s populace, there are 
aspects of the policy that raise questions as to who will benefit.   Coupled with the introduction 
of this new regional economic policy, recent revisions of the Law on Regional National 
                                                 
5 See Gladney (2003), Goodman (2002). 
6 Xinjiang Showcases Regional Autonomy of Ethnic Groups, at 
http://english.people.com.cn/200510/01/eng20051001_212052.html (last visited March 30, 2006). 
7 See Sautman (1999), Yu (2004), Moneyhon (2002). 
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Autonomy which limit the autonomous nature of minority regions, such as the Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region, suggest that this development program may be intended by the central 
government to promote greater integration of minority and non-minority populations, which 
conflicts with the central government’s commitments to the maintenance of regional ethnic 
autonomy.8  If so, it would also be a continuation of China’s programs of the 1990’s to promote 
the migration of Han Chinese to border regions and autonomous regions in a policy of mixing 
sand, chan shazi 铲沙子. 
   In fact, it has been increasingly posited by observers that the situation unfolding in 
Xinjiang with the introduction of the “Go West Campaign” is creating a situation of core-
periphery relations akin to those that Michael Hechter used to formulate his arguments for the 
application of his model of internal colonialism to the British Isles (Goodman 2002, Gladney 
2003, Moneyhon 2004).9  There is even evidence that a cultural division of labor, like that 
described by Hechter as being the precursor for internal colonization, existed in Xinjiang on the 
eve of the implementation of these new economic policies.10 Opposing models of core-periphery 
relations, such as the Diffusion theory of development which describe a “trickle-down effect,” 
have been offered by Chinese policy makers and analysts to argue that the Han and minority 
populations within Xinjiang will eventually benefit as the results of the program slowly trickle 
down to all segments of the population.   
                                                 
8 Under these revisions to the LRNA, the central government now has broader discretion over the allocation and 
exploitation of resources and agricultural products and certain powers of local autonomous regions have been 
curtailed (Moneyhon 2004). 
9 According to Hechter, efficient markets and industrialization will not necessarily level ethnic and racial differences 
if individuals of one group, such as the Uighur in Xinjiang, are subject to a cultural division of labor which he 
defines as a system of stratification maintained by the differential allocation of social roles and assets (2000: 38-39). 
10 Not only did Hannum and Xie find evidence of a cultural division of labor between Uighur and Han Chinese in 
Xinjiang, but they also conclude that this division is likely to continue unless educational gaps and other factors are 
not rectified (1998). 
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3.0  DEFINING THE WEST 
Before China’s economic policy for the west can be analyzed, it is necessary to identify the west 
and its place within China.  China’s west has long been an imprecise social and political 
construct, as social and cultural characteristics of the region have continuously changed since 
incorporation into the Chinese sphere (Newby 1996).  Even in the context of the current 
development program, the demarcation of the west has been unclear from its inception.  
According to Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of “two overall situations,” eastern and southern coastal 
areas were supposed to subordinate their interests to interior areas; however, he never stipulated 
which regions and jurisdictions were to be included (Goodman 2002: 133-35).   
During The Ninth Five-year Plan (1995-2000), the Western region was identified as 
inclusive of: Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Tibet, Yunnan, Sichuan, Chongqing, 
and Guizhou (Holbig 2004:351).  Along with these western provinces and the municipality of 
Chongqing, the central provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Hubei, Shanxi, Hunan, 
Anhui, Jiangxi, and Henan were initially targeted for inclusion in the revised economic policies 
for development.  However in 2000, the central provinces of China, with the exception of Inner 
Mongolia, were removed from the framework for the “Go West Campaign” and were relegated 
to being bridges for development between eastern and western China. Surprisingly, the Guangxi 
Autonomous Region, which had previously benefited from the coastal development strategy of 
the 1980s and 1990s as part of the eastern coastal region, was added at the same time (Holbig 
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2004:354). In September of 2001, upon recommendation of the State Council, the Xiangxi Tujia-
Miao Autonomous Prefecture of Hunan province, the Enshi Tujia-Miao Autonomous Prefecture 
of Hubei province, and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture of Jilin province were 
granted inclusion to benefit from the regional economy being implemented for the West.11   
With these new inclusions, reference to China’s west in the new policy to “Open Up the 
West” is somewhat metaphorical with the west being defined as a region within China with some 
of the highest rates of poverty, largest concentrations of minorities, and least developed 
economic infrastructure.  Table 1 provides selected indicators on population, income, and 
primary school enrollment, while Table 2 provides data on industrial output by ownership sector 
for each provincial level unit.  As shown by the data in these tables, the provincial level units in 
the west are in general, socially and economically disadvantaged, but not exclusively.  Xinjiang, 
which has experienced continuously high rates of growth, has a GDP per capita of 6,470 yuan 
per capita that compares favorably with that of Hainan (6,383 yuan) which is grouped with the 
coastal regions, and Jilin (6,341 yuan), an early industrial center in the northeast.  In terms of 
foreign investment and the growth of share-holding enterprises, which are usually regarded as 
indicators of economic development and reform, the west is characterized by the predominance 
of the state sector in the region’s industrial output which is a hindrance to economic reform and 
growth.  At the same time, the levels for foreign investment and share-holding enterprises in 
Chongqing and Inner Mongolia compare well with Liaoning and Heilongjiang in the northeast 
which is now singled out by Beijing as a lagging region.   
                                                 
11 “Suggestions on the Implementation of Policies and Measures Pertaining to the Development of the Western 
Region,” pp. 150-151. 
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 Table 1: Selected Indicators for Population, Income, and Education 
 
Provinces Population (million) GDP per cap ita (yuan) Secondary school 
enrollment  
(% of population 
between ages 15-19) 
Cities    
Beijing 12.57 19,846 45.7 
Tianjin 9.59 15,976 44.1 
Shanghai 14.74 30,805 45.8 
Coastal    
Jiangsu 72.13 10,665 52.5 
Zhejiang 44.75 12,037 43.7 
Guangdong 72.70 11,728 47.2 
Hainan 7.62 6,383 49.8 
Fujian 33.16 10,796 46.4 
Shandong 88.83 8,673 46.8 
Northeast    
Liaoning 41.71 10,085 48.5 
Jilin 26.58 6,341 53.9 
Heilongjiang 37.92 7,660 40.5 
North    
Hebei 66.14 6,932 55.3 
Shanxi 32.04 4,727 41.6 
Henan 93.86 4,894 49.6 
Central    
Anhui 62.37 4,707 41.8 
Jiangxi 42.31 4,661 40.2 
Hubei 59.38 6,514 47.8 
Hunan 65.32 5,105 48.7 
West    
Inner Mongolia 23.62 5,350 41.8 
Guangxi 47.13 4,148 45.6 
Chongqing 30.75 4,826 40.4 
Sichuan 85.50 4,452 42.1 
Guizhou 37.10 2,475 49.5 
Yunnan 41.92 4,452 42.9 
Tibet 2.56 4,262 35.8 
Shaanxi 36.18 4,101 53.0 
Gansu 25.43 3,668 46.3 
Qinghai 5.10 4,662 37.0 
Ningxia 5.43 4,473 43.3 
Xin jiang 17.74 6,470 53.8 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000 (China Statistical 
Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe 2000. Table 4-3 population, Table 3-9 
GDP,  Table 4-7 population aged 16-18, and table 20-24 for school enrollment. 
 
 9 
 Table 2: Industrial Output by Percentage Ownership 
 
Province State sector 
enterprises 
Collective 
sector 
enterprises 
Share-holding 
and Private 
enterprises 
Foreign-funded 
enterprises 
Cities     
Beijing 58.5 6.7 3.6 31.2 
Tianjin 33.0 19.9 3.1 44.1 
Shanghai 44.7 7.6 2.7 44.9 
Coastal     
Jiangsu 35.9 28.7 7.3 28.1 
Zhejiang 30.1 32.3 12.8 23.9 
Guangdong 27.6 11.6 5.7 55.1 
Hainan 60.0 2.0 19.9 18.0 
Fujian 31.9 6.4 4.9 56.8 
Shandong 43.0 33.2 9.1 14.8 
Northeast     
Liaoning 66.5 10.2 5.0 18.3 
Jilin 72.3 6.1 7.1 14.6 
Heilongjiang 83.2 5.5 5.4 6.0 
North     
Hebei 56.2 25.1 7.3 11.4 
Shanxi 70.8 18.6 6.2 4.5 
Henan 55.8 27.5 9.1 7.6 
Central     
Anhui 65.6 13.1 11.4 9.9 
Jiangxi 79.4 8.7 2.4 9.4 
Hubei 56.8 20.4 13.2 9.6 
Hunan 69.6 17.1 6.7 6.7 
West     
Inner Mongolia 72.2 3.6 18.3 5.9 
Guangxi 66.4 14.5 8.8 10.4 
Chongqing 65.2 6.9 15.9 11.9 
Sichuan 68.3 10.7 13.8 7.2 
Guizhou 84.9 8.5 3.9 2.7 
Yunnan 78.3 9.2 7.3 5.3 
Tibet 65.0 22.9 11.8 0.3 
Shaanxi 74.7 6.9 6.5 11.9 
Gansu 79.9 13.9 2.7 3.5 
Qinghai 84.0 3.0 10.8 2.2 
Ningxia 81.1 5.0 5.8 8.1 
Xin jiang 88.1 4.9 4.5 2.7 
 
Source: National Bureau of Labor Statistics, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000 (China 
Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2000: Table 13-5. 
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This mixed economic picture for the west as a region to be targeted by this latest 
economic policy, provokes some questions as to the real motivations behind the implementation 
of the policy.  This is especially salient when Xinjiang is factored into the discussion.  Though 
Xinjiang ranks 12th among Chinese provincial units for GDP per capita, and is the only province 
among the interior and western provinces with a GDP per capita above the national average, it 
has been identified as an integral component of the “Campaign to Open the West” (Hu and Wen 
2001).  This is perhaps because of the possible implications of asymmetric development are no 
where more apparent than within the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.   
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4.0  XINJIANG AS PART OF THE PLAN 
Xinjiang, positioned at the crossroads of Central Asia and once the apex of many of the region’s 
trade routes, borders Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan.  Not only are these borders strategically important for the PRC, but the territory within 
the boundaries of Xinjiang occupies one sixth of China’s landmass and at 660,000 square miles 
is as large as Britain, France, Germany and Italy combined (Chen 1977:15).  In addition, 
Xinjiang is thought to hold vast reserves of natural resources and energy deposits.12 Xinjiang is 
also home to China’s nuclear test sites at Lop Nor.  However, Xinjiang’s strategic geopolitical 
position and abundant resources are not the only factors which have insured the central 
government’s high level of supervision of Xinjiang’s economic development. 
Xinjiang is also one of the few regions in China in which the Han population is still a 
minority.  Even though the proportion of the Han population reached 40.5 per cent in 2000, the 
population of Xinjiang’s southern half is still composed of 90 per cent Uighur13, a Sunni Muslim 
minority, which has a long history of uprising against the central government in Beijing and 
comprises just under one half of Xinjiang’s population (Becquelin 2004:361).   
                                                 
12 Though James Dorian believes that they exaggerate the potential for oil and gas production, some Xinhua news 
reports (“Report on Xinjiang, Oil, Gas Exploration,” Xinhua June 13, 1997) suggest that the Tarim Basin may have 
oil reserves equivalent to three times the total reserves for the United States. 
13 See Figure 1 
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 Though Xinjiang is one of China’s most diverse regions with thirteen officially 
recognized minority groups, it is also one of China’s most segregated areas.  Han Chinese live 
predominately in the Junger Basin north of the Tianshan Mountains and are concentrated in the 
three largest urban centers, Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi as well as the autonomous prefectures 
of Changji, Bortala, Tacheng, Hami, and Bayangol, while the Uighur population is relegated to 
the less industrial Tarim Basin south of the Tianshan Mountains.  This division between the 
north and south is so pronounced that residents often view the north and south as entirely 
different regions. This geographic segregation in Xinjiang also corresponds with economic 
disparities within Xinjiang itself.  Though much of this disparity between the north and south can 
be attributed to the greater rates of urbanization and industrialization in the north, per capita GDP 
figures as well as figures for average wages suggest that this economic disparity also correlates 
with ethnicity. As Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate, higher per capita GDP correlates with higher 
concentrations of Han residents.  As Figure 3 illustrates, the growth trend of per capita GDP also 
increases with the concentration of Han residents.  
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Figure 1: Xinjiang Per Capita GDP and Ethnic Composition by County Level (2000) 
Data Source: Xinjang tongji nianjian 2001 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe. Tables 2-23 and 4-7. 
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Figure 2: Xinjiang Per Capita GDP and Ethnic Composition by County Level (2004) 
Data Source: Xinjang tongji nianjian 2001 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe. Tables 2-23 and 4-7. 
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Figure 3: Changes in GDP 2000-2004 
Data Source: Xinjiang tongji nianjian 2001 and 2005 (Xinjiang    Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo   
tongji chubanshe. Tables 2-23, 3-10, and 4-7. 
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The GDP in the Han Chinese strongholds of Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi alone 
exceeds that of all of southern Xinjiang.  Though I have found no statistics on living standards 
broken down by ethnicity or minzu14,  several analysts of Xinjiang have remarked on the 
correlation of high concentrations of Han Chinese with high incomes, and the reverse with high 
concentrations of Uighur residents (Bachman 2004: 164-168; Toops 2004b:177). Data from the 
Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook on average wages by industry and region also correlate with this 
trend with Han population centers in the north such as Urumqi and Karamay ranking ahead of 
most of the minority regions in the south (See Table 3). Though the Turpan region, a 
predominantly Uighur region, compares well with the second highest average wage, it is one of 
the few regions in which minority business predominate in the local economy. 
Average wages by industry and region Weimar’s research also suggests that each one 
percent increase in Han population adds an increment of 44 yuan to per capita income (2004: 
177).  In southern Xinjiang where average wages are half the provincial average, only 
Bayangol’s per capita GDP has eclipsed the provincial average. Bayangol also happens to have 
the largest concentration of Han Chinese in the south.  At the same time, Khotan, which has a 
population that is 97 percent Uighur, lags behind the rest of Xinjiang in all most every measure, 
including industry, construction, transportation, wholesale trade, telecommunications, and retail 
and catering trades (Table 2-27, 新疆统计年鉴2005).  Ethnic minorities in Xinjiang also 
compose a disproportionately small portion of the workforce in industries with the highest 
concentrations of Han workers in industries that pay higher average wages (Table 4).  
                                                 
14 Statistics for income and employment broken down by ethnicity are closely guarded even in regions of China 
where relations between Han Chinese and non Han populations are less politicized.  Through her interviews with 
officials in Guangxi, Katherine Kaup found that officials were forbidden to publish figures comparing Han and 
Zhuang incomes (Kaup 2000: 151). 
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Table 3:Average Wages per Worker by Industry and Region 2000  (Yuan) 
 
Region Total  Rank Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Energy Construction
North        
Urumqi 
City 
10,853 3 4,575 9,692 9,408 21,403 9,009 
Karamay 
City 
16,160 1 7,186 19,355 13,438 17,690 17,200 
Shihezi 
City 
8,094 6 6,384 -- 7,557 12,249 5,928 
Turpan  12,779 2 5,961 22,886 6,964 12,995 6,507 
Hami  8,093 5 4,973 10,642 7,579 18,345 6,412 
Changji 
Hui  
7,633 10 6,687 6,986 7,223 14,875 8,231 
Tacheng  6,529 13 5,143 7,824 7,370 10,806 7,037 
Altay  7,135 12 4,437 10,774 6,089 8,951 6,507 
Bortala  6,329 14 4,701 6,226 6,625 9,869 7,039 
South        
Ili  6,307 15 4,248 6,504 7,013 11,237 7,321 
Bayangol  7,625 11 5,043 10,545 7,436 11,089 6,654 
Aksu  8,050 7 7,762 6,742 7,088 11,618 6,763 
Kizilsu  8,817 4 7,543 4,966 5,993 10,772 6,511 
Kashgar  7,747 9 5,211 6,298 5,723 10,592 6,682 
Khotan  7,915 8 4,967 6,305 4,768 8,082 6,057 
 
Source: Xinjiang tongji nianjian 2001 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe. Table 3-44. 
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Table 4: Minority Representation by Industry, 2000 
 
Industry Average 
Wage 
(Yuan) 
% Han 
2000 
% 
Minority 
2000 
Finance / 
Insurance 
13714 72 28 
Mining 13524 80 20 
Energy 13223 76 24 
Transportation 12790 77 23 
Scientific 
Research 
11505 78 22 
Construction 10220 88 12 
Health Care 10114 54 46 
Government 9494 57 43 
Education 9398 44 56 
Manufacturing 8209 79 21 
Agriculture 5573 75 25 
 
Source: Xinjiang tongji nianjian 2001 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe. Tables 3-20 and 3-22. 
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Even in the agricultural sector of Xinjiang’s economy, peasant incomes vary greatly with 
per capita incomes in predominantly Han Chinese regions of the north being reported at 2,666 
yuan and per capita income in the Uighur dominated south being reported at 1,320 yuan in 2001, 
or less than half as much, which is an increase of 9.8% over the wage differential between 
peasants in the north and south in 2000.15
This economic disparity along ethnic lines has fueled ethnic tension within Xinjiang and 
has prompted some to allude to the possibilities of a Kosovo-like crisis in China.16  In the wake 
of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent central Asian republics 
neighboring Xinjiang, Uighur separatist rumblings have begun to be taken more seriously by the 
central government.  Not only did the disintegration of the Soviet Union result in an upswing in 
Uighur identity and pride, but also in a spate of bombings and separatist riots.17  This ethnic 
unrest continued through the 1990s and resulted in the implementation of the “Strike Hard” 
anticrime campaign designed in Xinjiang to crack down on Uighur separatists and eradicate 
crime which captured more than 2,700 terrorists and criminals in a mere span of a few months 
(Rudelson 1997:21-23).  In response to these increasing security concerns, China has joined 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia in forming the “Shanghai Six” to 
prevent separatists and extremists from promoting regional insecurity.   
                                                 
15 Figures obtained through Woqu nongye shengchan fazhan zhuangkuang, http://www.xj.gov.cn/xjfz/fazhan.php 
(accessed on December 21, 2005). 
16 See “The Hinterland: Plan to Avoid Asian Kosovo,” China Economic Review, March 13, 2001. 
17 Though estimates for ethnic unrest vary widely, Becquelin quotes Abulahat Abdurixit, Chairman of the XUAR 
government, admitting in 1999 that “if you count explosions, assassinations, and other terrorist activities, the total 
comes to a few thousand incidents.” (Becquelin 2004, pp.361). 
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5.0  XINJIANG AS THE NEW FRONTIER 
As a buffer zone against invasions of China from inner Asia and later as a frontier between 
China and the Soviet Union, Xinjiang is just one of the latest frontiers to be accreted to the 
enlarging core of China proper.  Even the term Xinjiang 新疆 refers to Xinjiang’s status as “new 
territory.”  As in the case of Michael Hechter’s British Isles, Xinjiang has long been 
administered as a peripheral region by Beijing. What is occurring in Xinjiang today with the 
implementation of the Western Development campaign is not an entirely new development with 
the Chinese empire successively expanding and contracting its role in administering Xinjiang.  
Historically, Xinjiang has been governed indirectly through imperial governors and members of 
native elites who were able to pit the settlers of the Tarim Basin in the south against the nomadic 
groups on the northern steppes of Xinjiang in a strategy of “divide and rule” (Lattimore  1951).  
Though native elites among the native population have largely been replaced with the party 
apparatus, there is one group which is integral to Beijing’s administration of Xinjiang, the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) or bingtuan 兵团, which has been able to 
reinforce the previous north/south divisions through Han resettlement campaigns and Corps 
activities.   
In fact, it is through the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps that the “Open up 
the West Campaign” has become a conduit for Beijing’s control of Xinjiang.  With comparisons 
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being drawn by Becquelin between Beijing’s current policies and those of the Qing dynasty in 
which, according to Milwood, ”the court opted for intensified Chinese colonization, lifting 
restrictions on Han settlement in the Tarim Basin, allowing merchants and homesteaders to settle 
permanently…establishing state farms worked by Han soldiers and their families” (Milwood 
1998: 235).    
Originally established by demobilized Kuomintang and PLA soldiers in 1957, the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps has grown into an agency composed of 2.5 million 
members, 88 % of which are Han, who are directly administered by the State Council (Becquelin 
2004:360).  Much like the earlier Han settlers of the Qing Dynasty, the XPCC was originally 
mandated to reclaim land, garrison the frontier region with central Asia, and to populate strategic 
border regions and transportation corridors within Xinjiang.  Through the 1990’s, the XPCC has 
continued this cycle of establishing cities and garrisons to promote settlement and to exercise 
dominion over the frontier regions (Gaubatz 1995:76).  After the collapse of the USSR and the 
emergence of the newly independent Central Asian Republics and the ongoing Uighur separatist 
movements, the XPCC has also adopted the role of protecting Xinjiang from internal threats such 
as ethno-nationalist unrest (Becquelin 2004:366).18
Even without its new mandate to defend against internal threats and its role in the “Go 
West Campaign”, the XPCC has an integral influence on the administration of Xinjiang.  The 
Corps has over 16 million mu of farmland, nearly a third of Xinjiang’s arable land, comprises 
nearly 12.9 percent of Xinjiang’s population or nearly a third of Han registered within the 
province (Becquelin 2004:367).  The Corps’ economic activities within Xinjiang are also 
immense with the Corps leading 174 agricultural and animal husbandry regiment farms, and 
                                                 
18 This role has included the XPCC’s involvement in the “Strike Hard” Campaign and the continued buildup of 
demobilized soldiers who can serve as a reserve security force. 
 20 
more than 427 commercial and industrial enterprises.19  In essence, the Corps functions like a 
state owned enterprise (SOE) with many of the commiserate problems such as low productivity, 
an aging workforce, an inability to compete effectively with private enterprises, and a reliance 
upon central government funds for much of its budget (Becquelin 2004:84-86).    
However, this situation may be reversed with the XPCC’s inclusion as a primary player 
in the Xinjiang component of the “Go West Campaign.” The Corps’ land reclamation activities, 
ability to attract migrants from interior China as well as demobilized soldiers, and consolidation 
of territorial control through its string of Corps administered municipalities, such as Shihezi, 
meld well with the primary objectives of the Go West Campaign.  This has been reflected 
through the XPCC’s involvement with the Tarim River Rehabilitation Project, a major 
component of the Campaign in Xinjiang, as well as the Corps’ increasing involvement in 
construction, infrastructure development, and the extraction of energy sources which are all 
explicitly mentioned in the Chinese White Paper on the economic development of Xinjiang, as 
being industries targeted for development with the Campaign.20 Much of the Campaign in 
Xinjiang also revolves around XPCC strongholds in the north such as Shihezi.21  Chinese 
scholars even concede that the “future of the Corps is the most fundamental question regarding 
the stability and development of Xinjiang” (Ma 2002:7).     
These official views of the XPCC and its role in the development of Xinjiang are in 
discord with opposing views from the minority populations in the region.  Though it is true that 
the XPCC’s activities have contributed to the industrialization and urbanization of Xinjiang, the 
                                                 
19 Xinjiang ribao, July 23, 2002. 
20 See http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/index.htm 
21 Shihezi has been the headquarters of the XPCC and along with the municipalities of Ala’er, Tumusuke, and 
Wujiaqu was developed by the Corps.  Shihezi and the area surrounding it including the Shihezi Reclamation Area 
and the Shihezi National-Level Economic and Technological Development Zone have been designated as key 
projects. China News Service, March 16, 2003 (FBIS-CHI-2003-0316). 
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benefits of the XPCC’s past activities have largely accrued disproportionately to the members of 
the XPCC itself, which is 88% Han (Becquelin 2004:360),  creating a cultural division of labor 
as discussed by Hannum and Xie. The XPCC’s activities have also contributed to a growing 
influx of Han migrants under a policy of “mixing sand” or chan shazi to settle Han migrants in 
regions that have large concentrations of minority populations.22  This coupled with the 
preponderance of Han cadres (52 %) and few minority leaders at the county level and above 
(13.7 %) has diluted the influence of minority groups such as the Uighurs in Xinjiang and gives 
other groups, including the Han, disproportionate authority in the governance of Xinjiang (Zang 
1998: 115-117).  This has resulted in an ironic situation in which the XPCC, a Han organization, 
has more autonomy in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region than the XUAR’s Uighur 
residents through the administration of its own internal affairs, its own public security apparatus, 
jurisdiction over its own legal, administrative and business structures, as well as independently 
administered educational, health, and judicial systems. 
                                                 
22 Though official provincial statistics do not show a major increase in the Han population, and officials deny that 
this policy is contributing to a major rise in the Han population in Xinjiang, the Shihezi labor bureau reported that 
70,000 migrants from other provinces settled in Shihezi in 1997 alone (“Mingong hu yongru liuzhou,” Shihezi bao, 
January 1, 1998. p.2).  Xinhua news reports also cooborate this growth with reports of 100,000 migrants in Korla in 
1995 (Xinhua, May 19, 1997).  
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6.0  TWO PILLARS STRATEGY UNDER THE CAMPAIGN 
During the 1990’s, in an effort to boost the provincial economy of Xinjiang, and in part to attract 
more migrants through job creation, economic planners initiated an economic strategy to “rely on 
two pillars, one white, one black” in reference to cotton cultivation and oil exploitation 
(Becquelin 2000: 80).   This two pillar strategy was envisioned by central planners as a route to 
boosting provincial revenues and sideline industries through the development of oil and 
petrochemical industries as well as agricultural revenues through cotton production capable of 
raising the collective prosperity of Xinjiang’s minority population who are largely engaged in the 
rural economy.23  Though the Go West Campaign has been heralded in Chinese media sources as 
a departure from past regional economic policies, the “two pillar” strategy has become a major 
component of the Campaign due to its relative success within Xinjiang .  As part of the Go West 
Campaign, the Xinjiang Regional Development Planning Commission identified thirty key 
projects for inclusion in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), of which three of the thirty 
                                                 
23 Though Han workers predominate in the agricultural sector when measured by workforce participation (defined as 
permanent workers for regiment farms and work units) minority populations are concentrated in the rural  economy 
and are engaged primarily in oasis agriculture, animal husbandry and stockbreeding, and small trade and handicraft 
industries (Cao 1999: 11).  Of these rural regions in southern Xinjiang, only the Bayangol Mongolian Autonomous 
Prefecture has a majority Han population.  
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projects were geared towards promoting Xinjiang’s status as an agricultural base and four were 
intended to strengthen Xinjiang’s petrochemical and gas industry.24
Under the cotton strategy, Xinjiang has become a leading center for cotton production 
within China, rivaling cotton production bases along the Yellow River and Yangtze River.25  
Between 1990 and 1997, acreage under cotton production doubled and cotton production 
increased from 294,700 tons to 1,477,000 tons between 1989 and 2002 (新疆统计年鉴2003:72).  
This rise in cotton production and apparent success in the program led to the earmarking of 11.5 
billion yuan in the tenth Five-Year Plan for development of cotton production bases.  Though 
this past success has buoyed this investment, and cotton agriculture has been described as “the 
strategic motor for the province’s economic growth,”26 there are factors such as China’s entry 
into the WTO, price instability in cotton prices, reliance upon heavy subsidies, increased 
competition from cheaper imports, and the preponderance of small farms that may threaten to 
derail this component of the plan (Wang 2002). 
Though cotton production has continued to increase during the first few years of the 
Campaign, with Xinjiang’s annual production nearing two million tons (equivalent to the 
average U.S. annual cotton export) this growth in production has not been uniform.  Much of the 
increase in cotton yield has been contributed by predominantly Han areas with increases over 
three years of 108%, 73%, and 44% in the Han strongholds of Hami, Bayangol, and Karamay 
                                                 
24 The remaining projects include nine for road and railway construction, five in water resource projects, four in the 
power industry, and four categorized as industrial development (Economic and Technical News, Xinhua News 
Agency, January 19, 2000). 
25 Though the Yellow River and Yangtze River regions accounted for most of China’s cotton production prior to 
2000, cotton production in Gansu and Xinjiang has been rising rapidly with the total yields between 1996 and 2000 
reaching 7.52 million tons, 7.49 million tons, and 6.52 million tons for the Yellow River, Yangtze River, and the 
northwest respectively (Hsu and Gale 2001:19). 
26 Numerous reports in the Xinjiang Daily in 2001 and 2002 refer to Xinjiang’s cotton production base in this 
manner. 
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respectively.27  Though Uighur areas in general experienced strong growth in cotton production 
as well, those regions with the highest concentrations of Uighur cotton farmers and formerly key 
production bases experienced modest increases or even declines in production with Khotan 
experiencing a 4.2% decline and the Kashgar region, the second highest producer of cotton in 
2001 behind the XPCC at 17.1% of the provincial total, experiencing a modest 2% increase in 
total production, suggesting that these regions are concentrating on alternative crops such as 
melons and grapes that have proven profitable in the past.28  Even the Aksu region, which had 
the third largest production base for cotton, experienced a relatively modest increase of 22%, 
well below the average production increase over the three-year period for administrative regions 
in Xinjiang.     
Though the strategy for “putting cotton first” has provided financial incentives for 
increased cotton production in hopes of boosting agricultural revenue, Uighur farmers do not 
seem to be profiting from these expenditures.  Though provincial authorities in Xinjiang claim 
that cotton production is the best way for farmers to increase their incomes and promise that 
increases in cotton cultivation in Xinjiang will bring prosperity to all of Xinjiang’s nationalities, 
there is little evidence that cotton is even economically viable as either a development strategy 
for Xinjiang or as an income source for Uighur farmers.29  An official report of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science in 1996 even suggested that “the profitability of growing cotton is 
far from evident…the market risks incurred by peasants are higher and higher, and peasants 
naturally don’t want to grown cotton” (Wang 1997: 67). 
                                                 
27 Data for increases in cotton yield can be found in tables 5 and 6. 
28 According to Rudelson, the agricultural reforms which allowed for experimentation with alternative crops prior to 
the cotton strategy proved enormously profitable for Uighur farmers unable to compete with larger mechanized 
regiment farms (Rudelson 1997: 45-90). 
29 In his fieldwork in southern Xinjiang, Becquelin found that prior gains in cotton production were due to a quota 
system for cotton which was imposed upon households in order to insure continued growth in production, though 
profits often remained elusive (Becquelin 2000: 81). 
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Table 5: Indicators for Agricultural Sector by Region (2001) 
 
Region Total Area 
Sown (1000 
hectares) 
Area sown in 
cotton (1000 
hectares) 
Total cotton 
output (tons) 
Percentage of 
total output  
for Xin jiang 
Urumqi City 27.09 0 0 0 
Karamay City 3.95 3.03 4046 .26 
Turpan  50.39 13.79 16895 1.1 
Hami  36.34 5.81 6903 0.5 
Changji Hui  299.79 55.31 90888 6.05 
Tacheng  276.07 53.94 88566 5.9 
Altay  105 0 0 0 
Bortala  71.85 27.55 45159 3 
Ili  318.06 2.48 2596 0.2 
Bayangol  147.67 56.57 83601 5.6 
Aksu  366.06 145.47 230767 15.4 
Kizilsu  45.77 4.64 4906 0.3 
Kashgar  525.38 195.67 257054 17.1 
Khotan  205.37 37.35 40020 2.7 
XPCC 909.8 410.72 693934 46.3 
Total 3387.87 1012.33 1565035 100 
 
Source: Xinjiang tongji nianjian 2001 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe. Tables 8-15, and 8-17. 
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Table 6: Indicators for Agricultural Sector by Region (2004) 
 
Region 
Total Area 
Sown 
(1000 
hectares) 
Area sown 
in cotton 
(1000 
hectares)
Total 
cotton 
Output 
(tons)
Increase in 
cotton yield 
since 2001 
Cotton 
yield
(kg / 
hectare)
Urumqi City 29.03 0.10 105  1050 
Karamay City 8.40 5.90 5841 44 % 990 
Turpan  51.20 14.15 18519 9.6 % 1309 
Hami  41.85 9.03 14356 108 % 1590 
Changji Hui  315.09 73.55 118099 30 % 1606 
Tacheng  289.38 68.91 113182 28 % 1642 
Altay  107.51 0 0 - 0 
Bortala  71.12 30.15 58764 30 % 1949 
Ili  307.89 6.35 6773 160 % 1065 
Bayangol  181.31 85.31 144543 73 % 1694 
Aksu  391.20 160.67 281692 22 % 1753 
Kizilsu  42.33 6.14 8244 68 % 1343 
Kashgar  555.56 171.88 263334 2.4 % 1532 
Khotan  225.09 23.33 38339 - 4.2 % 1643 
XPCC 953.93 472.07 877760 27 % 1859 
Total 3570.89 1127.54 1949551 47 % -
 
Source: Xinjiang tongji nianjian 2005 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe. Tables 11-14, 11-17, and 11-18. 
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According to Ildiko, Uighur farmers claim that “the various inputs for cotton plus its 
labor intensity mean that there is no real profit in growing cotton” (Ildiko 1997: 95). This is not 
surprising given that Xinjiang’s cotton sector is still a small farm economy with the average size 
cotton farm in Xinjiang under one hectare (Ren 2002: 15).  This fragmentation among Xinjiang’s 
largely Uighur peasant farmers has led to higher costs of production, lower efficiency, and 
reduced productivity when compared with larger mechanized operations such as the regiment 
farms run by the XPCC. Beyond factors of scale, this problem is compounded by the heavy 
reliance of Xinjiang cotton producers upon pesticides, fertilizers, and irrigation systems with 
Xinjiang cotton farmers accounting for an estimated 25% to 30% of China’s annual use of 
pesticides (Yu et al. 2000).  This heavy dependence upon pesticides and fertilizers, which 
account for nearly 30% of production costs, the highest in the world,  has led some observers to 
compare Xinjiang’s cotton crop to Jamaica’s “hunger crop” of sugar with the return on 
investment ratio falling from 4:1 to 1:1 between 1990 and 1999 (Ren 2002: 20). 
Though profitability through cotton cultivation seems to be elusive for Xinjiang’s small-
scale Uighur farmers, the XPCC, which produces nearly half of Xinjiang’s cotton crop, is having 
more success with greater access to market information, irrigation and water resources, farm 
credit, and resources for greater mechanization.  In addition, XPCC farms are able to operate on 
a much larger scale, eclipsing the smaller land holdings of southern Xinjiang.  The XPCC has 
also had great success experimenting with genetically engineered specialty cotton strains such as 
the color cotton strains developed by the Tiancai Brand of the China Colored-Cotton Group, a 
flagship enterprise of the XPCC, which are capable of achieving revenues that are 50% higher 
than conventional cotton.30  The production of colored cotton has been so successful that the 
                                                 
30 Information on the Rainbow Group can be accessed through http://www.westech.com.cn. 
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Chinese Ministry of Agriculture has awarded Regiment Farm 148 in Shihezi with the title of 
“Home of Colored Cotton.”  In fact, XPCC farms’ production of specialty mid and long staple 
cotton is rivaling that of Egypt, and production of commercialized color cotton is expected to 
eclipse that of the United States (Ren 2002: 9).  Given this success and growing competition on 
the world market, Chinese economists have begun suggesting that cotton production should be 
relegated to increases in high quality specialty cotton versus conventional cotton (Sheng 2001: 2-
5).   However, seeds and equipment for producing these improved cotton strains are costly and 
the majority of small scale Uighur farms lack access to the capital required for such expansion.   
Along with incentives to increase cotton production in Xinjiang, there have been moves 
to strengthen Xinjiang’s textile industry by transferring textile production from eastern China 
where industrial centers such as Shanghai have traditionally accounted for the majority of 
China’s textile production.  Though this move by central planners promises to make China’s 
textile industry more competitive with its manufacturing base closer to the production center for 
cotton and access to a cheaper rural workforce, initial indications are that these textile mills are 
attracting poor Han migrants from neighboring western provinces rather than employing local 
Uighur or Han workers (Becquelin 2000: 81).  This trend in employing migrant Han workers 
from neighboring provinces is not a new development as the regiment farms of XPCC have long 
relied upon seasonal migrant Han workers, with fresh waves of migrants worsening relations 
between Uighur and Han.31  In his fieldwork, Becquelin found that the new arrival of Han 
migrants has also angered long-standing Han residents of Xinjiang (老新疆人) who have 
developed a sense of regional identity and see new migrants as outsiders who are competing for 
                                                 
31 This hiring of outside farm labor has also entailed ignoring the normal procedures regarding work permits and 
registration of residents (Wang and Chen 1996: 440). 
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limited resources such as fertilizers, seeds, and water (Becquelin 2000:84-85). Given these 
factors, some observers, including Becquelin, view the cotton component of the Go West 
Campaign in Xinjiang as nothing more than a guise for increased Han in-migration and 
resettlement on reclaimed lands in an attempt by Beijing to further consolidate its territorial grip 
upon Xinjiang.  Whether or not this is the case, aspects of the oil component of the plan do 
resonate with Becquelin’s concerns. 
Perhaps the most significant component of the Campaign to Open the West in Xinjiang is 
the petroleum and natural gas component.  With domestic oil consumption finally eclipsing 
production in 1993, Xinjiang’s potential oil wealth has been increasingly attracting Beijing’s 
attention. This has intensified local frustrations among Uighur who believe that, were it not for 
Beijing’s extraction of valuable resources, the region could easily be economically self-
sufficient, even wealthy (Dreyer 1994:255).  Though Xinjiang does have promising oil reserves 
and new discoveries have been made in Lunnan, Tazhong, Yinan, Hetianhe and Tahe in the 
Tarim Basin, early estimates promising reserves three times that of the United States have 
proven to be overly optimistic.32  However, Beijing appears to be undaunted by these reports and 
has pledged more than 500 billion yuan to support energy exploration projects and related 
infrastructure projects (Tian 2004: 620-621). 
In order to develop Xinjiang’s petroleum industry, the Chinese government is investing 
in much needed improvements to transportation and delivery systems for energy products.  The 
largest component of this investment has been the construction of oil and gas pipelines linking 
Xinjiang with the Eastern and coastal provinces. The first cross-country pipeline linking 
                                                 
32 Encouraged by Beijing’s promotion of Xinjiang as an untapped energy source, western oil companies were invited 
to test-drill for oil, but found that many of the promising discoveries did not warrant further investment (Cutler 
2000). 
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Xinjiang’s Tarim Basin with Shanghai is nearing completion, and at a length of over 4000 km, 
and constructed at a cost of more than 140 billion yuan, is one of the largest infrastructure 
projects in China’s history (Chaudhuri 2005: 19). Though these projects promise positive 
benefits for Xinjiang, especially in light of rising energy prices, they have had a minimal impact 
upon improving the regional distribution of income. According to Dwight Perkins, the 
development of the Tarim Basin’s oil and gas resources and the construction of pipelines to 
extract these resources has little to do with people within Xinjiang since most of the equipment 
and personnel are being shipped in from outside of Xinjiang (Perkins 2004: 20).  
Despite preferential policies for ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, the Go West Campaign’s 
infrastructure projects continue to siphon migrant workers from outside of Xinjiang rather than 
indigenous Uighur, and officials are limited in their ability to apply quotas to both private 
enterprises and the oil industry.33 For example, among the 4,000 technical workers on the 
Taklamakan Desert oil exploration project, only 243 were from minority groups (Moneyhon 
2002: 507). This along with the admission of the Regional Party Secretary, Wang Lequan, that 
“the workforces in Xinjiang’s oilfields all come from other oilfields in China,”34 suggests that 
although these projects may be contributing to the acceleration of growth in gross domestic 
product since the inception of the campaign, there is little to suggest these projects are increasing 
the standard of living among the majority of Xinjiang’s citizens (Lai 2003: 135).  Rather, like the 
Go West Campaign’s cotton policy, the oil policy is likely to encourage increased migration of 
Han to Xinjiang, reversing the flow of migrants to the southeast and instead resulting in “the 
peacock flying west,” in the words of a member of the State Council (Li 2000). 
                                                 
33 For an explanation of these preferential policies see Sautman (1998). 
34 Economic & Technical News, Xinhua News Agency, January 19, 2000. 
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7.0  PAVING THE WAY FOR GROWTH  
Before Xinjiang can even accrue benefits from the Go West Campaign and become a conduit for 
trade with Central Asia, Xinjiang’s isolation from both coastal China and its neighbors to the 
north must be rectified with improvements to Xinjiang’s deficient transportation infrastructure.  
Though California grapes take less than a week to make it to fruit stands in coastal China, 
Turpan’s primary export of grapes can take up to fifteen days to reach coastal China (Pomfret 
2000).  As part of the Tenth Five Year Plan, the central government has earmarked 100 billion 
yuan for railway construction projects in western China, with plans to extend the Kashgar-
Urumqi rail line into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, add a rail line connecting Yining with 
Kazakhstan, and improve existing east-west lines.  In addition, Beijing is investing 700-800 
billion yuan to build highway networks across the western region with major components in 
Xinjiang. 
Though these transportation infrastructure improvements promise to strengthen 
Xinjiang’s long term economic outlook through improved market access for Xinjiang’s 
agricultural products and petroleum resources, the short term gains have thus far been mixed.  
Though these large expenditures in infrastructure are providing economic opportunities for 
thousands of workers in Xinjiang and wages in the construction sector have risen substantially,35 
                                                 
35 Average wages per worker in the construction industry rose 72 % between 2000 and 2005 (Xinjiang Statistical 
Yearbook 2001 and 2005).  Table 3-44. 
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there is evidence that, not unlike the case with seasonal agricultural workers and petrochemical 
workers, that the majority of workers involved in these projects are coming from outside of 
Xinjiang with estimates of 250,000 Han migrants a year being drawn to Xinjiang to work on 
construction and infrastructure projects (Pomfret 2000). 
Though preferential employment policies have allowed Uighur workers to gain a small 
foothold in Xinjiang’s bloated state owned enterprises,36 recent reforms coinciding with the Go 
West Campaign have been eroding many of these gains.37 Amnesty International has filed 
reports documenting the replacement of minority managers in the privatization of textile and 
carpet factories in the Heitian area with Han Chinese, and Becquelin reports the widespread 
belief in Xinjiang among Uighur that downsizing SOE’s will choose to 下 维 ,or fire Uighurs 
first (Becquelin 2000: 85).  These observations coincide with Ma Rong’s study on Xinjiang’s 
labor force which suggests that Uighur and other Turkic ethnic groups in Xinjiang have less 
access to non-agricultural sectors (2002:15-20).  Though data on minority participation by 
industry is not available for 2004 or 2005,38 data from 2001 indicates that Uighur were under-
represented in every industry except for education, with the highest disparity in the most 
lucrative fields.39  Nicolas Becquelin even claims that “Many urban ethnic-minority business 
                                                 
36 According to Sautman (1998), Xinjiang’s state sector’s preferential hiring programs for minorities have provided 
urban Uighur welcome non-agricultural career outlets. Accounting for more than two thirds of provincial GDP and 
88% of Xinjiang’s industrial output, Xinjiang’s  largely inefficient state owned enterprises have been slow to 
reform. 
37 As a consequence of China’s economic reforms, managers are being allowed much more freedom in determining 
the composition and renumeration of their employees.  Some have expressed the fear that this increased freedom 
may also result in greater rates of discrimination as prior protections against labor discrimination erode (Maurer-
Fazio et al. 2004:7). 
38 Income differentials and ethnic composition of the workforce in autonomous regions is tightly protected.  Though 
the unit of observation for this type of data is on a prefectural level prior to 2002, this data is no longer included in 
the Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook.   
39 See Table 8. 
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people complained …. that they have encountered prejudice when seeking access to bank loans 
and administrative authorizations” (Becquelin 2000:85). 
In their examination of the effects of market reform upon the occupational attainment of 
minorities in Xinjiang, Hannum and Xie found that the existing gap in occupational attainment 
between Han and ethnic minorities had widened in large part due to differences in educational 
attainment as well as the strengthening correlation between educational attainment and non-
agricultural occupations.  This situation is further compounded by the gap in high school 
enrollment rates for students in predominately Han regions of Xinjiang and those in regions with 
high minority concentrations as illustrated by Figure 4. Though enrollment rates have risen 
during the campaign, the gap has also widened.  Illiteracy rates have  also increased in all regions 
of southern Xinjiang, with only the Han areas of Urumqi, Shihezi, and Changji reporting 
declines since 2001 (Figure 5). Though the Go West Campaign has promised to improve 
educational standards across Xinjiang and promote technological research and development in 
the region to promote the growth of new industry and foreign direct investment in the region, the 
results so far have been disappointing. Not only has the region been unable to attract FDI,  
funding for research technological development and research is still very low in southern 
Xinjiang with funding actually declining in Turpan, Khotan, and Bayangol while remaining at 
zero in Kashgar (Table 8). 
Though some of these education disparities can be attributed to rural/urban differences 
between areas that have high concentrations of Han and minority residents, they may also be 
attributed to economic asymmetries between the different regions.  With the decentralization of 
fiscal power, schools have become highly dependent on the local economy for a large portion of 
their budgets with villages now sponsoring primary schools, townships supporting junior 
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secondary schools, and local counties supporting senior secondary schools (Cheng 1995: 70). 
This has resulted in educational disparities with richer areas capable of funding basic education, 
while poorer areas are facing increasing difficulties in funding educational improvements and are 
falling behind, creating an impossible situation for local governments. 
Beyond developing China’s human resources, described by Zheng (1999:121) as the 
weakest in the Asia-Pacific region at the end of the 1990s, education has other roles that coincide 
with the other objectives of the “Go West Campaign.” Education can be used as a means for 
implementing affirmative action policies and is seen by Beijing as having an integral role in 
maintaining stability and promoting greater integration of China’s diverse ethnic population 
(Iredale et. al. 2001: 70). If China’s campaign to develop regions like Xinjiang is to succeed, 
China’s human capital development must coincide with the campaign’s economic development 
objectives. 
Even the Xinjiang CCP Committee recognizes that the retreat of the state-command 
economy and the introduction of market forces have contributed to the deterioration of the 
position of ethnic groups. In an investigative report released in 2001, the Committee disclosed 
that “the power of intervention of the government has steadily decreased, and the difficulties of 
finding a job for minority laborers has become larger, especially in contract farm work and non-
public industrial work.  Implementing equal opportunities has become less achievable.”40  
Whether the economic policies of the Go West Campaign will be able to reverse this trend 
remains to be seen. 
 
 
                                                 
40 For the full report, see “Guanyu zhengque renshi he chuli xingshi xia Xinjiang minzu wenti de diaocha baogao,” 
Makesizuhyi yu xianshi 13(2):34-38. 
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Table 7: Growth in Average Wages 
 
Region Total  Agriculture Manufacturing Energy Construction 
Urumqi 
City 
75.6 113 82 50 54 
Karamay 
City 
23 47 11 --- -14  
Shihezi 
City 
63 104 43 30 82 
Turpan  40 46 38 93 98 
Hami  76 85 27 37 89 
Changji 
Hui  
56 37 31 61 42 
Tacheng  62 60 35 60 49 
Altay  66 70 42 -3 44 
Bortala  86 102 33 56 80 
Ili  80 78 54 49 54 
Bayangol  83 82 46 76 95 
Aksu  73 76 86 57 71 
Kizilsu  82 74 28 9 91 
Kashgar  75 110 39 17 71 
Khotan  88 60 44 83 71 
 
Source: Xinjiang tongji nianjian 2001 and 2005 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe. Table 3-44. 
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Figure 4: Enrollment Rates for Regular Senior High Schools by Region 
Source: Xinjiang tongji nianjian 2001 and 2006 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Beijing Zhongguo tongji   
chubanshe. Tables 18-22 and 4-3.   
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Figure 5: Illiteracy Rates  
Source: Xinjiang tongji nianjian 2001 and 2005 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Beijing Zhongguo tongji   
chubanshe.  
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Table 8: Indicators for Technological Development 
 
Region Number of 
Research 
Agencies 
(2000) 
2004 Number of 
people 
engaged in 
technological 
development 
and research  
2004 Funding 
(10,000 
Yuan) 
2000 
2004 
Urumqi 17 25 1952 2217 16016.5 24285.6
Karamay 2 17 2450 4522 28080.5 69250.7
Shihezi 5 6 195 570 2001.6 8713.5
Turpan 5 1 1610 524 6576.2 5227.1
Hami 0 3 209 176 108 306
Changji  3 9 319 522 3736.7 21219.4
Ili 0 9 38 404 2568.2 5532.4
Tacheng 1 4 47 145 60.9 2809
Altay 2 2 17 36 109.3 1452.6
Bortala 0 0 0 0 290.2 1270.8
Bayangol 5 5 779 635 7067.8 0
Aksu 1 3 103 416 1138.8 47287.1
Kashgar 0 0 0 0 0 0
Khotan 1 0 305 0 320 0
Source: Xinjiang tongji nianjian 2001 and 2005 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook), Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe. Table 15-24 and 18-3.  
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8.0  CONCLUSION 
This paper has discussed the manner in which Xinjiang has been impacted by the initial stages of 
the much heralded Go West Campaign.  In this paper, I have discussed the imperatives driving 
the Chinese leadership’s adoption of this economic policy following two decades of economic 
reforms.  Though these reforms ushered in by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 have led to an average 
annual growth rate of 7.5 %, much of this growth accrued disproportionately to Han residents of 
Xinjiang.  Though the Go West Campaign as the latest regional economic policy to be applied to 
Xinjiang promised to alleviate these inequalities, initial indicators suggest that the development 
of Xinjiang’s agricultural bases, exploitation of petroleum and natural gas resources, 
transportation infrastructure improvements, and educational reforms are contributing to increased 
asymmetrical development within Xinjiang, rather than alleviating pre-existing inequalities. 
Though the cotton strategy has achieved growth in Xinjiang’s cotton production, former 
Uihgur cotton production bases in southern Xinjiang are experiencing slow or stagnant growth, 
not surprising given the comparative advantage of the larger XPCC farms.  Though specialty 
cotton strains are being promoted successfully, this avenue appears closed to independent 
farming operations and thus the majority of Uighur farmers will not benefit directly.  Even the 
initial stages of the oil and petroleum components of the two pillar strategy are bringing few 
rewards for Xinjiang’s indigenous population with oil and petroleum workers being transferred 
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to Xinjiang from other parts of China.  Though both pillars are contributing to Xinjiang’s rising 
GDP, migrant Han workers are the primary benefactors.  
In this regard, the Go West Campaign is similar to past development policies 
implemented in Xinjiang.  The most significant demographic change since the founding of the 
PRC in 1949 has been the increase of Xinjiang’s Han population.  Though only 6.7 percent of 
the province’s population was Han in 1949, this percentage has reached 40 percent primarily 
through migration of Han from neighboring provinces.  As in the past, this latest campaign is 
promoting Han immigration in a similar process to earlier policies dating back to the reign of the 
Qianlong Emperor (1735-95).  Though the campaign promised to promote integration through 
economic development and a reduction in economic asymmetry between Xinjiang and the rest of 
China, it is promoting integration through the immigration.   
Even the promised improvements in transportation infrastructure development and 
education policies have failed to promote equality, with investment in research and development, 
and education, falling in the predominantly Uighur areas of southern Xinjiang.  Rates of 
illiteracy have dramatically increased and past gains obtained through educational preference 
politics are being eroded, making it less likely that the occupational obtainment gap between 
Uighur and Han will close.  Sentiment among the Uighur seems to match these indicators.  
Herbert Yee’s survey in Urumqi, where many components of the Go West Campaign have been 
concentrated, regarding perceptions in increases in the standard of living under reform policies 
found that 15.1% of Uighur thought that their standard of living had grown faster than that of the 
Han, while 46% thought that the increase was about the same with 38% claiming that their 
standard of living had risen at a slower rate in comparison to that of the Han (Yee 2003: 443).   
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Though China’s Campaign to Develop the West may be promoting the overall economic 
growth of regions like Xinjiang as well as promoting greater integration through migration of 
Han workers, its initial stages are not fulfilling the Beijing’s stated objectives of reducing 
asymmetric development.  In order to obtain social cohesion and foster “an expectation of a new 
order of social experience that will encompass both harmony and the official promotion of 
diversity (Chao 1996:211),” China’s economic development must coincide with policies that 
allow for the development of all of China’s human capital. 
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APPENDIX  
GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS  
西新疆维吾尔自治区  Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 
部大开发竞选活动   Great Western Development Campaign  
新疆统计年鉴     Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
兵团     Unit, or corps – Often used when referring to the XPCC 
老新疆人   Han who migrated prior to Xinjiang prior to the reform period 
铲沙子   “Mixing Sand” refers to policy to promote integration through  
    the resettlement of Han. 
下 维    Colloqial phrase referring to the dismissal of Uighur workers  
    before Han workers in reforms of state owned enterprises                      
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